Hastings Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 1

Article 3

1-1984

Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory
Religious Accommodation in the Workplace
Marion K. McDonald

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Marion K. McDonald, Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory Religious Accommodation in the Workplace, 36 Hastings L.J. 121
(1984).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol36/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory

Religious Accommodation in the Workplace
The establishment clause of the first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."'
This prohibition not only bars the establishment of a national religion, 2
but also invalidates government 3 aid of sectarian objectives. 4 In essence,
the establishment clause mandates government neutrality in religious
5
matters.
Most establishment clause cases have involved public aid to parochial schools6 or religious practices in public schools. 7 These cases have
not clearly defined the limits of permissible state support of religion. For
example, the Court has struck down statutes that required public schools
to engage in activity that has a significant religious component, such as
posting the ten commandments, 8 prohibiting the teaching of Darwinian
evolution, 9 mandating bible reading in public schools,' 0 requiring students to recite a state-composed prayer in public schools," or authorizing the use of public schoolrooms for religious instruction.' 2 The
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The religion clauses of the first amendment provide in their
entirety: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15 (1947).
3. The establishment clause of the first amendment was held applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The free
exercise clause was similarly applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
4. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
5. See, eg., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 676 (1970); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222, 226, 306 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952); Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
6. See, eg., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salaries, textbooks, and
other materials); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (construction grants to colleges);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (bus transportation).
7. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer reading in public schools);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release time from public schools for religious
training).
8. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
9. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
10. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
12. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Supreme Court has allowed, however, government aid to religious organizations for activities that have an insignificant religious component,
such as property tax exemptions for religious organizations, 13 reimbursement of public bus transportation costs for parochial schoolchildren,14
and release time from public schools for religious instruction.' 5 Yet the
Court has invalidated less obvious forms of aid, such as a tuition reimbursement program for parents of parochial schoolchildren, 16 the use of
public funds to reimburse sectarian schools for state-mandated services, 17
textbook loans to sectarian schools,' 8 the use of public funds for maintenance, repair, and tuition reimbursement in nonpublic schools,' 9 and
20
Thus, the bounds of
teacher salary supplements for sectarian schools.
21
proper support of religion remain unclear.
Recently, important and controversial establishment clause
problems have arisen in the employment arena. A number of federal and
state laws now require employers to accommodate the religious observ-

ances and practices of their employees. 22 For example, in 1972 Congress
amended title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196423 to include an affirma-

tive duty to accommodate on religious grounds. 24 Many states have
13. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
16. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
17. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
18. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), reh'g denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975).
19. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
21. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980); see also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
22. These statutes permit employees to advance "reasonable accommodation" rules to
avoid working on their Sabbath, and thereby alter their normal work schedule.
23. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as
title VII].
24. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). Section
7010) codified the affirmative duty to accommodate by providing:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Prior to 1972, title VII simply prohibited employers from using religion, or other enumerated
criteria, as a factor in employment decisions. Section 703(a) of title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

September 1984]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

adopted statutes or regulations that prohibit religious discrimination in
the workplace and require an employer to modify facially neutral work
practices when these practices conflict with an employee's religious belief
or observance. 25 Although such laws have been challenged in federal
appellate courts on constitutional grounds, 26 the courts have declined to
address the constitutional questions and have focused primarily on statutory interpretation. 27 The Supreme Court has not determined whether
religious accommodation in the workplace violates the establishment
28
clause.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
25. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461(g), 41-1463 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 101-570, 45-19-22 (1982); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 344.030(5), 344.040(1), 436.165(4)(a) and (b)
(1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 492 (Supp. 1983); id. at art. 49B, §§ 14-16 (1979); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4.1A (Law. Coop. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.115 (Vernon 1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(4) (1955); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.10 (McKinney 1982);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-30(k), 1-13-80 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE §§ 40.1-28.2, 40.1-28.3 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 61-10-27 (1977); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983).
Other state laws have been interpreted to require religious accommodation. See ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.200 (1983), as interpreted in Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 583 P.2d
860, 864 (Alaska 1978), vacated, 601 P.2d 860 (Alaska 1979) (The court remanded for a determination of whether the requested accommodation constituted undue hardship); CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 8, as interpreted in Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence, 24 Cal. 3d
167, 173-74, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, 911-12, appeal dismissed for lack of a substantialfederal
question, 444 U.S. 986 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975), as interpreted in
King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 602 n.1 (Iowa 1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979), as interpreted in Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Local
1361, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 383 A.2d 369, 378 (Me. 1978).
In other states, religious accommodations are required by guideline or regulation. See
[State Laws] Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 7 453:1141 (Colo. Sept. 25, 1980); id. at ] 453:1708
(D.C. June 11, 1976); id. at 7 453.2756 (Ill. Dec. 12, 1973); id. at 7 453:3301 (Kan. May 1,
1978); id. at 7 455:1094 (Mich. Dec. 12, 1973); id. at %455:1938 (Mont. July 14, 1983); id. at 7
455:2351 (Nev. Apr. 6, 1961); id. at 77 457:555-:556 (Okla. Feb. 25, 1977); id. at 7 457:1754
(S.D. Dec. 16, 1979); id. at 7 457.1887 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 1979).
The statutory enforcement mechanism of title VII expressly includes state nondiscrimination laws that parallel or supplement the requirements of title VII as part of its enforcement
scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982).
26. See, eg., Anderson v. General Dynamics, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied,
454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981).
27. See, eg., Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980); Yott v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980);
Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978); see infra notes 227-32 & accompanying
text. The case that provides the primary authority for the construction of the religious accommodation provision of title VII is Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
In Hardison, the Supreme Court for the first time ruled on the extent of the reasonable accommodation provision and held that requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost
would constitute an "undue hardship" on the employer. Id. at 84. Hardison left open the
question of whether a statute can, consistently with the first amendment, require employers to
grant privileges to religious observers as a part of the accommodation process. Id. at 70.
28. See, eg., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affd mem. by
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The Court will have this opportunity when it reviews Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 29 This case involves a Connecticut statute that
prohibits an employer from requiring employees to work on their designated day of Sabbath. 30 In Thornton, a retail employer was unable to
accommodate a supervisory employee who refused to work on Sundays.
The employee then resigned. 3 1 The trial court held that this termination
violated the statute. 32 The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and
held that the statute established religion in violation of the first amendment. 33 The sole issue now before the United States Supreme Court in
Thornton is whether a state statute may require a private employer to
34
defer to an employee's desire not to work on his or her Sabbath.
Thornton represents the first time that the Supreme Court squarely will
address the constitutionality of mandatory accommodation of Sabbath
practices in the employment context.
The Supreme Court's decision in Thornton may significantly affect
the future of the religious accommodation doctrine. First, the decision
will affect the states' power to mandate religious accommodation in the
workplace. 35 Second, a decision affirming the state statute would likely
resolve the constitutionality of title VII religious accommodation requirements. 36 The state statute at issue in Thornton contains an absolute
requirement that an employee may not be compelled to work on his or
her "Sabbath" and so is stricter than the title VII mandate, which reevenly divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated on nonconstitutionalgrounds, 433 U.S. 903
(1977); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affid per curiam by
evenly divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). A judgment entered by an equally divided Court is
not entitled to precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972). The Court in
Hardison did not reach the constitutional question.
29. 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 6,
1984) (No. 83-1158).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(b) (1982); see infra notes 54-59 & accompanying text.
31. The term "termination" refers to any employment separation, whether voluntary or
involuntary. A resignation or retirement is a voluntary termination of employment. A discharge is an involuntary termination of employment. ASPA HANDBOOK OF PERSONNEL AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 4-228 (D. Yoder, H. Heneman eds. 1979).
32. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, No. 252522 (Conn. Super. Ct., August 25, 1981).
33. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983).
34. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S., Mar. 6, 1984) (No. 83-1158); see also Brief for Petitioner
at i.

35. Brief for United States at 3.
36. As the Solicitor General of the United States pointed out in his amicus curiae brief
supporting the petitioner in Thornton:
A decision upholding the Connecticut law, which goes beyond the religious accommodation requirements of Title VII would a fortiori resolve the constitutionality of
the federal law. Conversely, adoption of the reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme
Court by other courts would, of necessity, prompt challenges to the validity of the
religious accommodation requirements of Title VII.
Brief for United States at 2.
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quires only "reasonable accommodation. '3 7 Thus, a decision upholding
the Connecticut statute impliedly would validate the less burdensome title VII provision. Third, the Court's decision potentially could extend
first amendment law in an altogether new way. Until now, the religion
38
clauses of the first amendment have been applied only to state action.
In Thornton, however, the conduct of private entities is at issue. If the
Court upholds the state statute, not only could a Sabbath observer compel a private party to accommodate his religious needs, but other plaintiffs might be able to39 enforce other first amendment rights against private
defendants as well.
Finally, the Court's decision in Thornton will have significant practical ramifications for employers. Religious accommodation requirements
affect the efficient operation of business. Employers must adjust work
schedules based on an employee's religious demands. Such accommodation may force the employer to hire additional employees for weekend
workshifts, 4° pay overtime rates for weekend work,4 1 or cope with increased absenteeism. 42 Understaffing on weekend shifts can affect the
safety of other employees or of the public. 4 3 Furthermore, morale may
decline among employees who must work weekend shifts in place of religious employees and among those who perceive the employers' scheduling decisions to be unfair. 44
This Note examines the constitutionality of the mandatory accommodation statute at issue in Estate of Thornton v. Caldorand of the "reasonable accommodation" provision of title VII. The Note first sets out
the facts and the statute involved in Thornton.45 Next the Note briefly
reviews the applicable constitutional standard for determining whether a
statute violates the establishment clause. 46 This standard is then used to
evaluate the constitutionality of the religious accommodation requirements found in the Connecticut and federal statutes.47 The Note argues
that both of the statutes are unconstitutional because they provide an
37. See supra note 24.
38. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3341 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970).
39. This could occur if the Supreme Court rules that free exercise considerations justify
upholding the state statute. See infra notes 150-66 & accompanying text.
40. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); Dewey, 427 F.2d at
330.
41.

Hardison,432 U.S. at 84.

42. Id.
43. See, ag., United States v. City of Albuquerque, 423 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.M. 1975),
affld, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976) (firemen); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp
1382 (D. Neb. 1974) (electric linemen).
44. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975), affid, 429 U.S. 65
(1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Dewey, 429 F.2d at 330.
45. See infra notes 49-74 & accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 75-111 & accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 112-240 & accompanying text.
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employment benefit on an explicitly religious basis. Finally, the Note
concludes that the Supreme Court should invalidate the Connecticut
statute in Thornton and leave the responsibility for religious48 accommodation in the workplace to the employer and the employee.

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor
In 1975 Donald Thornton became a supervisor with Caldor, Inc., a
New England chain of retail department stores. 49 At that time, Connecticut required most employers, including Caldor, to close on Sundays. 50
In 1976 the Connecticut legislature authorized certain businesses to remain open on Sundays. 5' The new law provided that no employee may
be compelled to work more than six days in any calendar week, and mandated further that "[n]o person who states that a particular day of the
week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work
on such day. '' 52 In addition, the law provided that an employee shall not
be dismissed for refusing to work on his Sabbath.5 3 The constitutionality
of this mandate is at issue in Thornton.
Pursuant to the state statute, in 1977 Caldor began doing business
on Sundays. Under a rotation system, Thornton and other department
managers were scheduled to work one out of every four Sundays. Between 1977 and 1979, Thornton worked thirty-one Sundays. In November 1979, however, he informed Caldor that, as a Presbyterian, he would
no longer work on Sunday because that day was his Sabbath. 54 Caldor
48. See infra notes 239-40 & accompanying text.
49.' Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 337, 464 A.2d 785, 788 (1983).
50. See generally Note, A CriticalHistory of ConnecticutSunday Closing Legislation Since
1955, 12 CONN. L. REV. 539 (1980).
51. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts. 415.
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(a)-(b) (1982). In its entirety, § 53-303e states:
(a) No employer shall compel any employee engaged in any commercial occupation
or in the work of any industrial process to work more than six days in any calendar
week. An employee's refusal to work more than six days in any calendar week shall
not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(b) No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath
may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.
(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of subsection (a)
or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state board of mediation and
arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of said
subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole,
including but not limited to reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more
than two hundred dollars.
CONN. GEN. STAT.

§

53-303e (1982).

53. Id.
54. From the record, it appears that Thornton's initial objection to Sunday work was
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was unable to accommodate Thornton's demand, 5" and Thornton resigned from his job and filed a grievance with the Connecticut Board of
Mediation and Arbitration (the Board). Thornton alleged in his griev56
ance that he had been discharged in violation of section 53-303e(b).
The Board sustained Thornton's grievance, and Caldor moved the
state court to vacate the Board's award on constitutional grounds.5 7 Relying on McGowan v. Maryland,"8 the trial court concluded that section
53-303e(b) did not violate the establishment clause because the provision's purpose and primary effect were secular: the Act merely limited
the number of days per week that an employee could be compelled to
work.5 9 The trial court affirmed the Board's decision.
Caldor appealed from this judgment 6° and renewed its earlier challenges. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the lower court's deci-

sion and held that section 53-303e(b) was unconstitutional on its face
under the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.6 1 In reaching this result, the supreme court found
nonreligious. Joint Appendix at 54a, 65a. There is no evidence that abstaining from work on
Sunday is a tenet of the Presbyterian denomination. Joint Appendix at 76a-79a. Moreover,
Thornton's refusal to work was not limited to Sabbath work shifts. He also refused to work on
a Tuesday because it was New Year's Day, although it is unclear whether he based his objection on religious grounds. Joint Appendix at 40a.
55. Following Thornton's ultimatum, Caldor executives met with him on several occasions to resolve the problem. Caldor offered Thornton two choices which would have met his
demands for no Sunday work: transfer in a supervisory capacity at the same rate of pay to a
nearby Massachusetts store that was not open on Sundays, or reassignment to a nonsupervisory bargaining unit position at his current location, whose union contract did not routinely
involve Sunday workshifts. Thornton rejected both alternatives.
Section 53-303e(b) on its face neither requires nor permits such an accommodation of an
employee's religious beliefs; indeed it does not address accommodation at all. The statutory
mandate is absolute, regardless of any resulting undue hardship on an employer's business.
See Joint Appendix at 30a. Thus, it is not surprising that Caldor offered no evidence on this
point. Under the collective bargaining agreement in effect at this facility, Sunday and holiday
work was largely voluntary or, if necessary, was scheduled in reverse order of seniority. Joint
Appendix at 91a. The record indicates that union employees do, however, accommodate their
employer's business needs by working during the periodic store inventory. Joint Appendix at
41a.
56. Subsection (c) of the statute gives the Board the power to enforce the Sabbath provision. Caldor argued that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the
statute and that the statute was unconstitutional. The Board concluded that it could not decide the constitutional question. Joint Appendix at 6a.
57. Joint Appendix at 14a. Caldor again argued that Thornton had not been "discharged" under the terms of the statute. Thornton cross-moved to affirm the Board's award.
Joint Appendix at 16a.
58. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
59. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, No. 252522, slip op. at 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1981).
The trial court's unpublished memorandum decision is reproduced in the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 19a-23a.
60. Joint Appendix at 24a.
61. The court sustained the Board's nonconstitutional findings. Thornton, 191 Conn. at
340-42, 464 A.2d at 789-91. The Connecticut Supreme Court declined to consider whether
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that section 53-303e(b) had a sectarian purpose, 62 primarily advanced
religion, 63 and caused excessive entanglement between religion and
government. 64
First, the court concluded that section 53-303e(b) lacked a clearly
secular purpose because "[t]he unmistakable purpose of such a provision
is to allow those persons who wish to worship on a particular day the
freedom to do so."' 65 Noting that "[section 53-303e(a)], which prohibits
employment for more than six days in any calendar week, adequately
addresses the valid secular purpose . . . of forbidding uninterrupted labor,"' 66 the court rejected the notion that the term "Sabbath" was simply
synonymous with a "day of rest" and devoid of religious meaning. 67 The
court reasoned that the commonly accepted meaning of the term is inescapably religious. 68 Thus, the right that section 53-303e(b) grants an employee to refuse to work on any day he designates as his Sabbath "comes
with religious strings attached," and this feature "invalidates the subsec69
tion under the establishment clause."
Second, the court found that the statute possessed the primary effect
of advancing religion because "it confers its 'benefit' on an explicitly religious basis." '70 The court recognized that:
Only those employees who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to
work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing.
Workers who do not "observe a Sabbath" may not avail themselves of
the benefit provided by the subsection,
and are not entitled to take a
71
specific day off with impunity.
The court determined that, because of the narrow scope of this benefit,
the primary effect of the statute was the advancement of religion, which
offends the establishment clause.
Finally, the court ruled that this law's "most troublesome" aspect
was that it "creates excessive governmental entanglements between
church and state."' 72 The court ventured that the board's enforcement of
the statute would "[i]nevitably, as employers challenge the sincerity of
§ 53-303e(b) was void under the Connecticut state constitution. Id. at 346 n.7, 464 A.2d at
792 n.7.
62. Id. at 349, 464 A.2d at 793.
63. Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 349, 464 A.2d at 793. The court applied the three-pronged Nyquist test for
evaluating the primary purpose and effect of a statute and its potential for creating excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 773 (1973); see also infra notes 84-99 & accompanying text.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Thornton, 191 Conn. at 347, 464 A.2d at 792.
Id.
Id. at 347, 464 A.2d at 793.
Id.
Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
Id.
Id.
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employees' Sabbath observance,. . . encompass an analysis of the particular religious practices and will require a decision concerning the scope
of religious activities which may fairly be labelled 'observance of Sabbath.' ,,73 This state review, the court noted, was "exactly the type of
'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' " that
the Constitution prohibits. 74

The Applicable Constitutional Test
75
Although legislative authority to regulate employment is broad,
76
the first amendment religion clauses limit this power. Thus, if a court
finds that an employer has violated a religious accommodation statute,
the court must then "decide whether that [statutory provision] is constitutionally permissible under the Religion Clauses of the First
'77
Amendment."
The establishment clause78 is a statement about the proper role of
government in society. 79 It embodies the principles of governmental separation from, and neutrality toward, religious institutions, beliefs, and
practices. 80 As the Supreme Court declared in Everson v. Board of
Education:81
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,

or prefer one religion over another. .

.

. In the words of Jefferson, the

to erect "a
clause against establishment of religion by law was
8 2 intended
wall of separation between church and State."

73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted petitioner Thornton a writ of
certiorari. 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 6,
1984) (No. 83-1158). The State of Connecticut, which did not participate in the action below,
was granted permission to enter the case as an intervenor. Thornton v. Caldor, No. 83-1158
(U.S. Mar. 19, 1984) (order granting motion to intervene).
75. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
76. The establishment and free exercise clauses, U.S. CONST. amend I, respectively provide that Congress shall not make laws "respecting an establishment of religion" or which
"prohibit the free exercise thereof." The religion clauses of the first amendment were designed
"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the
other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
77. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979).
78. This Note focuses on the establishment clause because the constitutional analysis of
the state court in Thornton is based on the establishment clause, and because the petition for
certiorari sought review of the Connecticut statute under the establishment 61ause. See Brief
for Petitioner at 2; see also supra note 34.
79. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3341 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 3343.
81. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. Id. at 15-16.
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The Supreme Court has developed a three-pronged analysis to determine whether a challenged government practice takes an impermissible
step toward the establishment of religion. 83 In Committeefor Public Education v. Nyquist,84 the Court held that: "[T]o pass muster under the
Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose . . . second, must have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . . and third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion."8 5 Since the inception of
the three-part test, the Supreme Court has used it as the standard for
8 6
establishment clause cases.
Two recent establishment clause cases, Marsh v. Chambers87 and
Larson v. Valente, 88 appear at first blush to signal a change in the
Supreme Court's establishment clause analysis. In Marsh, the Supreme
Court focused on historical evidence to uphold the constitutionality of a
state legislature's practice of opening their sessions with a prayer. The
Court concluded that this practice had become a part of the fabric of
society and that its unique history posed no threat to the establishment
clause; the practice was simply a tolerable acknowledgment of widely-

89
held beliefs.
Marsh is clearly distinguishable from Thornton. First, Marsh involved government action and did not compel the action of private individuals. Second, although legislative prayer existed at the time the
establishment clause was drafted, 90 there is no similar history of religious
accommodation in the workplace. 9' Thus, the historical approach em83. In applying the establishment clause to legislative actions, the Court has recognized
that some tension exists between the goal of preventing intrusion and the reality that total
separation is not possible. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358-59 (1984).
84. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
85. Id. at 772-73. The Nyquist decision did not originate the three-part test. The Court
formulated the elements of the test through a series of establishment clause cases. The secular
purpose and primary effect parts of the test emerged in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), and were later expressed in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
The entanglement prong was added in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The complete test was first announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Its reaffirmation in
Nyquist, however, underscored its significance in establishment clause analysis. Indeed, the
Nyquist Court described the tripartite test in mandatory terms. 413 U.S. at 772-73 ("Taken
together, [our] decisions dictate that to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, the law in
question [must satisfy the three elements of the Lemon test]."). See generally Note, The Establishment Clause and Religious Influences on Legislation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 944 (1980).
86. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see also Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam).
87. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
88. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
89. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335-36 (1983).
90. Id. at 3333.
91. As Justice Brennan's compelling dissent demonstrated, the limited rationale of the
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ployed in Marsh would probably not apply to Thornton or to other religious accommodation in employment cases.
In Larson v. Valente,92 the Court used a strict scrutiny analysis to
invalidate a state statute that overtly favored certain religious denominations over others through registration and disclosure requirements for
contributions to religious organizations. 93 The Court held that a statute
which intentionally discriminates among religions is invalid unless justified by a compelling state interest. 94 Unlike most establishment clause
cases, Larson involved a statute which discriminated among religions on
its face. Although the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to reach its
result, the Court also pointed out that the Nyquist test reflected similar
concerns. 95 Thus, after Larson, strict scrutiny is apparently required if a
statute contains direct denominational preferences among religions, but
the Nyquist test still applies when a statute affords a benefit to some religions or religion generally.
The Court's most recent establishment clause decision demonstrates
that neither Marsh nor Larson signaled a major change in establishment
clause doctrine. In Lynch v. Donnelly,96 the Court held that a city's display of a nativity scene did not violate the establishment clause.
Although the Court expressed unwillingness to confine itself to a single
method of analysis, 97 the Court's decision was based on the traditional
Nyquist test.98 The reaffirmation in Lynch of the viability of the Nyquist
test,99 as well as the distinction between Marsh and Larson, on the one
hand, and religious accommodation cases such as Thornton, on the other
hand, indicates that the three-prong Nyquist test should apply in the religious accommodation in employment context.
Those who favor religious accommodation laws in the employment
area nevertheless argue that accommodation statutes should be evaluated
under a different constitutional standard. 1°° These proponents contend
Marsh decision carved out an exception to the establishment clause, but did not reshape establishment clause doctrine. Id. at 3338.
92. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
93. Id. at 246-51. The state statute provided that only those religious organizations
which solicited more than 50% of their total contributions from non-members were subject to
the registration and reporting requirements of the charitable solicitations statute, while religious organizations which received less than half of their contributions from non-members
were exempt from these requirements.
94. Id. at 246.
95. Id. at 251-55.
96. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
97. Id at 1362.
98. Id. at 1362-65. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor took pains to demonstrate
that the analysis of the Marsh and Larson decisions may be assimilated into the Nyquist test.
99. Id. at 1367 n.1, 1369-91; id. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Significantly, all of
the appellate courts that have addressed the constitutionality of § 701(j), see supra notes 26-27,
have used the Nyquist test.
100. See infra note 150 & accompanying text. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
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that because such laws promote the free exercise of religion and accommodate individual religious practices, they are justified under the free
exercise clause and should be judged under less stringent scrutiny than
the Nyquist test requires.
This argument is not compelling. First, religious accommodation
statutes do not directly implicate free exercise rights. The free exercise
clause bars governmental regulation of an individual's beliefs' 0 1 and pro02
tects citizens from governmental persecution on account of their faith. 1
When an employer discriminates against an employee on the basis of religion, however, there is no state action that would predicate a free exercise claim. Thus, religious accommodation laws cannot be construed to
prevent or to remedy infringement of free exercise rights. Second, the
prohibition of religious establishment is broader than the guarantee of
free exercise.' 0 3 The establishment clause prohibits legislation that,
although not regulating religious belief, uses the government's coercive
power to aid religion.l°4 Thus, there is a distinction between cases raising establishment clause questions and those raising free exercise questions. 0 5 Third, although the plight of Sabbath observers in the
workplace may prompt some concern relating to free exercise values,
of free exercise claims which could
these concerns do not rise to the level
06
override the establishment clause. 1
Finally, while the free exercise clause prohibits state action that denies anyone the right of free exercise, "it has never meant that a majority
could use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs."' 1 7 After all,
if the free exercise clause were so broad, the establishment clause would
have no meaning. The establishment clause is violated when government
places its power, prestige, and financial support behind a particular religious belief.' 0 8 Such imprimatur is no less offensive when perpetrated
(1972), the Court used a "compelling state interest" standard to evaluate a free exercise infringement claim. The plaintiffs in Yoder, members of the Amish religion, sought an exemption from state-imposed compulsory education laws that were alleged to be a burden on their
free exercise rights. Unlike Yoder, which involved governmental actions only, the present case
involves a statute that compels private employers to grant a religion-based preference to certain employees upon their request. Thus, there is no state action which would give rise to a
free exercise claim. See infra note 155.
101. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
102. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464 (1961).
103. Id. at 467.
104. Id. at 453.
105. Id. at 462; see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
106. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 789.
107. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226.
108. Id. at 221. The Supreme Court noted in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962),
that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
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under the banner of the "free exercise of religion."10 9 Government must
therefore pursue a course of neutrality to give proper respect to both of
the religion clauses at the cost of neither. 110
In sum, the three-part Nyquist test is the applicable constitutional
standard in Thornton and the proper means of analyzing the constitutionality of title VII's religious accommodation provision. In the next
section the Note considers whether Connecticut General Statute section
53-303e(b) or section 701(j) of title VII withstands the scrutiny of the
Nyquist test: ' whether the statutes have a sectarian purpose, possess a
primary effect which advances religion, or create excessive entanglement
between government and religion.
Applying the Test
Purpose
To withstand constitutional attack under the establishment clause, a
statute must have a clearly secular purpose. The "mere existence of
some secular purpose" does not suffice; 1 2 the statute must in fact avoid
the evils at which the establishment clause was aimed-"sponsorship, fiand active involvement of the sovereign in religious acnancial11 support,
tivity. 3 The secular purpose inquiry therefore focuses on whether the
government's action endorses or disapproves of religio ,1 14 explicitly or
implicitly.115
Secular Purpose and the Connecticut Statute
The legislative history of section 53-303e(b) reveals no evidence of a
secular purpose. In 1976 the Connecticut legislature was forced to reconsider its Sunday closing laws after a state court declared them unconstitutional.1 1 6 Although a bill was introduced to repeal all Sunday
business regulation, the legislation that was ultimately enacted substantially restated the old law. 117 Throughout the debate, legislators expressed the fear that employees would be forced to work on Sundays.11 8
109. Cf.Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 789 ("the constitutionality of [the] benefit does not turn...
on the label we accord it").
110. Id. at 792-93.
111. See infra notes 112-240 & accompanying text.
112. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24.
113. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
114. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 453.
116. State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A.2d 244 (Conn. C.P. 1976). See generally Note, supra note 50.
117. See Note, supra note 50, at 551 n.44.
118. See 19 CONN. SEN. PROC., pt. 5, 1976 Sess. 2013-54; 19 CONN. H. PROC., pt. 6, 1976
Sess. 2409-49; 19 CONN. H. PROC., pt. 8, 1976 Sess. 3416-91; see also 19 CONN. SEN. PROC.,
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The legislature's concerns about Sunday work strongly suggest a sectar-

ian motive." 19
Moreover, the statutory language reveals a sectarian purpose. Sec-

tion 53-303e(b) prohibits an employer from compelling an employee to
work on any day that the employee designates as his Sabbath. As the
Connecticut Supreme Court recognized, this section, on its face, endorses
religion. 120 This conclusion is particularly apt when the statute is considered in light of its companion subsection, section 53-303e(a), which al12 1
ready provides a weekly day of rest to prevent uninterrupted labor.
The additional blanket exemption from Sabbath work thus improves the
employment position of only the religious employees.
Three arguments can be made that section 53-303e(b) has a secular
purpose, notwithstanding its language and legislative history. One argument is that the statute promotes the legitimate goal of providing a common day of rest for workers. 22 This approach relies on an analogy to
123
the Sunday-closing laws which were upheld in McGowan v. Maryland
24
and its companion cases.'
In those cases, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Sunday-closing laws served the civil welfare of the state by
supporting the legitimate objective of having a uniform weekly day of
rest and leisure for social and family activities. 25 The fact that this purpose "merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
pt. 5, 1976 Sess. 2014 (remarks of Sen. Lieberman) ("[P]eople in this State would be forced to
work on Sundays; forced, not by the law explicitly, but forced by the immeasurable economic
laws that would govern."); id. at 2019-21 (remarks of Sen. Ciccarello); 19 CONN. H. PROC., pt.
6, 1976 Sess. 2415 (remarks of Rep. Weber). While there are no direct references to § 53303e(b) in this debate, the Senate bill containing § 53-303e was finally adopted. See Note,
supra note 50, at 551 n.44.
119. Substitution of the word "Sabbath" for "Sunday" in the final version, while slightly
broadening the number of Judeo-Christian sects which may claim the benefit of this provision,
does not alter its sectarian thrust.
The Connecticut state courts immediately voided the entire statutory scheme. Note,
supra note 50, at 554. Despite the courts' condemnation, the legislature in 1978 responded by
enacting yet another Sunday closing law-again containing § 53-303e-without addressing the
constitutional infirmities of its previous statute. This revision has also been found invalid. See
Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979).
120. Thornton,191 Conn. at 347, 464 A.2d at 793.
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(a) (1982); see supra note 52. The state therefore need
not further act to ensure that religious persons rest, for their faiths require that they do so. Cf
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 576 n.7 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 30.
123. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
124. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc.
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S.
617 (1961).
125. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445, 449. Those laws, though religious in origin, were saved
only on the theory that such laws today address the secular custom of resting one day a week
and that the religious element is a mere relic. Id. at 442; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 264 (Brennan,
J., concurring); Gallagher,366 U.S. at 627. In this country, the Court declared, the custom of
resting one day a week is traditionally honored. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614.
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or all religions" was deemed incidental. 126
This argument is inapposite to section 53-303e(b). First, the goal of
providing a common "day of rest" is undermined when that day can be
individually selected, as section 53-503e(b) allows. Second, section 53303e(a) independently provides for a day of rest. The purpose behind
section 53-303e(b), therefore, does not reflect a concern for "rest" or
"uniformity." McGowan and its companion cases thus provide no justifi-

cation for section 53-303e(b).
A second possible rationale for a secular purpose to section 53303e(b) is that the statute provides equal employment opportunities for
Sabbath observers who would otherwise face discrimination in the application of weekend work schedules.' 27 This argument also has no merit.
First, Sabbath observers are already protected from religious discrimination by Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act 2 8 and by title
VII.129 Second, section 53-303e(b) promotes, rather than prevents, discrimination: the statute requires employers to favor certain employees

on the basis of religion.' 30 Thus, casting the issue in terms of promoting
the general cause of equal employment opportunity ignores the religious

factor inherent in section 53-303e(b); a secular rationalization that fails
to avoid sectarian sponsorship does not immunize the statute from con3
stitutional attack.1 '
A third purported justification for the Connecticut statute is that,
without section 53-303e(b), the Sabbath observer would have to choose
between his employment and his religion.' 32 Proponents of this theory
argue that religious employees would be discharged or would be unemployable due to their inability or unwillingness to accept weekend
126. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442. Moreover, as the McGowan majority emphatically stated,
"[w]e do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the establishment clause if
it can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in
conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect-is to use the state's coercive
power to aid religion." Id. at 453.
127. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 29.
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-51 (1979).
129. See supra note 24.
130. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). This further
aspect of discrimination was noted in Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609. Although the Braunfeld
opinion specifically addressed only free exercise claims, the majority pointed out that exemptions to Sunday closing laws to accommodate individual Sabbath practices might require employers to hire individuals who qualified for the exemption based on their religious beliefs.
This itself would be a discriminatory practice. In Connecticut, employers would thus be faced
with the dilemma of violating one subsection of § 53-303e if they comply with another. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(d) (1982).
131. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
774.
132. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 29; see also Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d
445, 454 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981).
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work.1 33 These arguments, however, are overstated. Some individuals,
due to their religious beliefs, may be restricted in their ability to accept
certain types of employment. Although the conflict between their beliefs
and employers' scheduling of work may limit the range of their potential
job opportunities, such individuals are not completely excluded from employment. The Constitution does not preclude all conflicts between personal belief and social opportunity and, in some instances, may override
certain incidental costs to the individual. 134 Nor does it necessarily follow that the solution for such conflicts should be a penal statute which
compels an employer to rearrange its business affairs and burden its other
employees in deference to the Sabbath observer's unique, personal, and
135
religious demands.
In summary, the Connecticut legislation has no legitimate secular
purpose. The justifications advanced for the statute reflect neither legislative intent nor indispensable means of achieving a valid state objective.
Moreover, section 53-303e(b) is superfluous: the purportedly secular
goal of a common day of rest is already accomplished independently by
companion section 53-303e(a), and religious discrimination is already
prohibited by state and federal anti-discrimination statutes. Because section 53-303e(b) has no clearly secular purpose, the statute violates the
establishment clause of the first amendment.
Secular Purpose and Section 7010)
Although the constitutionality of title VII, section 701(j), is not at
issue in Thornton, the Court's holding has implications for the federal
religious accommodation provision. 136 In addition, proponents of section 53-303e(b) rely on title VII federal precedent to support the argument that the Connecticut statute is constitutional. 137 Section 701(j),
however, gives rise to the same establishment clause issues found in
Thornton.1 38 In this section the Note considers whether, like religious
accommodation requirements framed in absolute terms, religious accommodation requirements that call for reasonable accommodation without
undue hardship, as in title VII, are constitutionally invalid endorsements
of religion.
When it was first enacted in 1964, title VII did not contain a reli133. Brief for Petitioner at 29.
134. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 336 (6th Cir. 1970), af'd per
curiam by evenly divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404

(1963).
135. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 335.
136. See supra notes 35-37 & accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 18; Brief for Intervenor at 16-17; Brief for United
States at 2.
138. See infra notes 147-237 & accompanying text.
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gious accommodation provision.1 39 The Act simply required an employer to refrain from using religion as a criterion in employment
decisions. Religious accommodation as an affirmative duty first appeared
in guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."40 These guidelines were intended to satisfy the "needs" of certain sabbatarians. 141 A series of court cases construing these guidelines
prompted Congress to amend title VII in 1972 to include a duty of reli142
gious accommodation.
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,' 43 the Sixth Circuit held that an
employer's failure to accommodate a Sabbath observer's request not to
work on Sundays did not violate title VII, which was intended only to
inhibit discriminatory practices.44 Faced with similar facts in Riley v.
Bendix Corp.,145 a federal district court in Florida held that an employer
did not violate title VII when it terminated a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to work on the Sabbath.
In reaction to Dewey and the district court decision in Riley, and in
response to the urging of certain religious sects, Senator Jennings Randolph introduced section 701(j), which essentially codified the affirmative
duty to accommodate, as an amendment to title VII.146 The historical
context and the legislative history of section 701(j) illustrate that the purpose of this amendment was to aid certain sects by creating a statutory
right of Sabbath accommodation in employment. The legislative history
of section 7010) consists almost entirely of references to Dewey and
Riley, and to Senator Randolph's statement of concern for the Sabbath
observer. 4 7 An additional purpose of the statute, to maintain the mem139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra note 24.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
Id.
See infra notes 143-46 & accompanying text.
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affid by equally divided court per curiam, 402 U.S. 689

(1971).
144. Id. at 331. The court questioned whether Congress had the authority to compel an
employer to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. Such a construction, the court

noted, "would raise grave constitutional questions of violation of the Establishment Clause."
Id. at 334. The court of appeals highlighted the inherently discriminatory nature of the accommodation requirement and observed that "[accession] to Dewey's demands would require

Reynolds to discriminate against its other employees by requiring them to work on Sundays in
the place of Dewey, thereby relieving Dewey of his contractual obligation." Id. at 331.
145. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.

1972) (case was reversed because new EEOC guidelines were issued).
146. See supra note 24.
147. See 118 CONG. REc. 705-06 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISToRY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972, at 711-15 (1972). Senator Randolph
stated:
[Tihere are several religious bodies-we could call them religious sects; denominational in nature-not large in membership, but with certain strong convictions, that
believe there should be a steadfast observance of the Sabbath and require that the
observance of the day of worship, the day of the Sabbath, be other than on Sunday.
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bership rolls of churches, is reflected in the Senator's criticism of employment policies that conflict with Sabbatarian practices and reduce the
membership of religious organizations. 148 Several judges and commentators, however, have asserted that this obligation to grant employment
preferences to religious observers by adjusting facially neutral work policies, when such policies conflict with religious practices, has no clearly
149
secular legislative purpose.
Id. at 705.
148. See id. at 705 (remarks of Sen. Randolph) ("So there has been... a dwindling of the
membership of some of the religious organizations because of the situation to which I have just
directed attention."); id. ("My own pastor in this area . . . has expressed his concern and
distress that there are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially with the
younger people .... ").
149. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 204 (1976)
("[T]he remarks of Senator Randolph, who authored the 1972 Amendment to Section 701(j),
refer to relieving pressures against religious practices which have led to a 'dwindling of the
membership of some religious organizations' and certainly bring the legislative purpose into
doubt."); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 558 (6th Cir. 1975) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting) ("The purpose evident in [Senator Randolph's] remarks is the promotion of certain
religions whose followers' practices conflict with employers' schedules."), aff'd, 429 U.S. 65
(1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763,
766 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ("[T]o ascribe ... to the language of Senator Randolph . . .a secular
purpose to put teeth into the comprehensive statutory scheme is pure sophistry."), affid, 602
F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
It is noteworthy that only the cases which have questioned the constitutionality of
§ 7010) have discussed the major theme of Senator Randolph's remarks, i.e., the difficulties
experienced by members of certain religious sects. In contrast, those cases which uphold this
section cite, out of context, certain apparently neutral remarks which did not contradict or
nullify the religious purposes expressed by the amendment's sponsor. See, e.g., Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1975), aJfld, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated,
433 U.S. 903 (1977); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1972). Contra
McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. General Dynamics,
648 F.2d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Tooley v. MartinMarietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Nottelson
v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445, 453-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981). For
this reason, the cases which directly hold, or implicitly suggest, that § 7010) is constitutional
are not convincing because they fail to deal with the entire legislative history.
These arguments attempt to import to § 7010) the earlier overall objective of title VII
itself. The suggestion that the Senator's overriding theme was the elimination of religious
discrimination in employment is unconvincing. This amendment must be judged by its own
legislative history which, read in its entirety, and especially in light of the words of the proponent, shows that it was adopted to advance an obviously religious end.
The reasons for this conclusion were ably summarized in Judge Celebrezze's dissent in
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), afftd, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated,
433 U.S. 903 (1977) which, like Dewey and Riley, involved a claim by a Sabbath observer that
his religious practices conflicted with otherwise neutral work policies:
[Section 7010)] defines religion so as to require that persons receive preferential
treatment because of their religion. This contradicts the secular purpose behind the
original Title VII. Rather than "putting teeth" into the Act, it mandates religious
discrimination, thus departing from the Act's basic purpose. The second purportedly
secular justification for the rule is that it recognizes that "certain persons will not
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Free Exercise
A final argument for the constitutionality of religious accommodation statutes is that the purpose of such statutes is to promote the free
exercise of religion and to alleviate the "special burdens" that Sabbath
observers face when their beliefs conflict with their employer's work
schedules. 150 This argument essentially admits that the purpose of such
laws is religious, but asserts that this purpose is permissible because religious accommodation laws merely embody free exercise rights.
Although this argument undoubtedly has some emotional appeal, it
does not withstand close scrutiny. The free exercise clause does not authorize the government to act affi matively to advance religious ends.1 5 1
Faced with substantially the same argument in Nyquist, the Supreme
Court recognized that, because tension inevitably exists between the free
exercise and the establishment clauses, the government must remain neu1 52
tral and neither advance nor inhibit religion.
In Nyquist, the state argued that its program of tuition grants promoted the free exercise of religion by assisting low-income parents in asserting their rights to have their children educated in religious schools
and by alleviating the burdens imposed upon these parents by public
school taxes. 15 3 The Court declared that neither sympathy for these parents nor high-minded social purposes "justify an eroding of the limitation
1 54
of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted."
Due to the absence of state action in compliance with religious accommodation rules, however, such rules actually do not raise an issue
under the free exercise clause.15 5 The free exercise clause prohibits government action that interferes with the religious affairs of private citizens.
compromise their religious convictions" and ensures "that they will not be punished
for the supremacy of conscience."
The absence of a religious accommodation rule, however, would not amount to
punishment. It would simply be a "hands-off" attitude on government's part, al-

lowing employers and employees to settle their own differences. The rule grants benefits to religious practitioners because of their religion. The second rationale the

majority advances, therefore, amounts to an assertion that it is a valid secular purpose to grant preferences to persons whose religious practices do not fit prevailing
patterns.
Id. at 556 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
150. See, eg., Brief for Petitioner at 12-17, 29; Brief for Intervenor at 12, 15, 27; Brief for
United States at 15-16, 20, 26; see also 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972).
151. See, eg., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (mandatory
bible-reading in schools was an improper use of the machinery of the state to advance religion).
152. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.

153.

Id.

154. Id. at 788-89.
155. See infra notes 156-66 & accompanying text. The argument that aid to religion is
justified under the free exercise clause has been consistently rejected. See generally Torcaso v.

Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Both section 53-303e(b) and section 7010), on the other hand, address
the employment practices of private entities. Accordingly, private employer conduct generally would not be expected to raise free exercise issues, as purely private action cannot contravene the first amendment. 56
Those who adhere to the view that the free exercise clause justifies
religious accommodation laws rely primarily on three cases. 57 First, in
Sherbert v. Verner,158 the Supreme Court held that a Sabbath observer
whose religious beliefs precluded Saturday work could not be denied unemployment compensation under the state's eligibility rules. Second, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,1 59 the Court ruled that Amish schoolchildren could
be exempted from high school attendance because the state's compulsory
education laws placed a burden on appellants' free exercise of their religion. 16 0 Finally, in Thomas v. Review Board,16 1 the Court found that an

employee who objected on religious grounds to weapons manufacture
and left his job because he could not transfer to a department that did not
produce war-related materials, was eligible for unemployment benefits
under the free exercise clause, notwithstanding contrary state eligibility
requirements.
These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable from Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor and other cases that involve religious accommodation
in employment, because each involved state action. The holding in Sherbert, for example, "reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not
represent that involvement of religion with secular institutions which it is
the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall."' 162 It means that
government may not grant public benefits to a uniform class of persons
and then exclude certain people "because of their faith, or lack of it."' 163
The essential teaching of Sherbert, Thomas, and Yoder is that the state
may not apply an otherwise constitutional law against certain persons if
the law creates a burden on their religious beliefs or practices.' 64 These
156. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). Cf. Dewey, 429 F.2d at
329 (accommodation ordered under a free exercise case was distinguishable because the issue
"involved state, and not private action"); Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108, 112
(N.D. Ga. 1980) ("By striking down the provision, no free exercise problem arises, since no
congressional action will have taken place. The first amendment religious freedoms are not
triggered by congressional inaction, but rather by its failure to adhere to the admonition that
'Congress shall make no law.' ").
157. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 13-14; Brief for Intervenor at 19, 29.
158. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
159. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
160. Nevertheless, the Court warned of the danger that an exemption from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the establishment clause. Id. at
221.
161. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
162. 374 U.S. at 409.
163. Id. at 410 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
164. See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3341 n. 13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also,
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cases did not empower the government to step in and force private citizens to support certain religious practices. Accordingly, the limit on permissible government accommodation to religion, i.e., that states must
defer when their actions hinder religious practices, does not apply to
individuals. 165
In summary, when a Sabbath observer seeks to modify his working
schedule to observe his particular religious practices, he exceeds the limits of his constitutional freedom to act on, or to freely exercise, his religious beliefs if this accommodation forces his employer to modify its
business schedule. 166 Therefore section 701(j), like the Connecticut statNottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445, 454-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046
(1981).
165. See, eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970), affd per curiam by evenly divided court, 402
U.S. 689 (1971). On this issue, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), is inapposite because the constitutional mandate of accommodation that the Court recognized applied to government in its public actions, such as released time from public schools and use of public
facilities for religious instruction. Id. at 1359. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
The free exercise clause cannot be used to support an attempt to coerce or compel others
to follow the practices of any religion. Indeed, the Constitution serves to ensure that no one
need bow to the religious beliefs of another. For example, Justice Brennan observed in Sherbert that the recognition of the claimant's right to unemployment benefits was possible because
it did not "serve to abridge any other person's religious liberties." 374 U.S. at 409. On this
point, the statement in CantweU v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), has often been quoted:
"[The first amendment] embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." Id. at 303-04. Or, as Judge
Learned Hand explained:
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government, though even
then, not in all circumstances. . . but it gives no one the right to insist that in the
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious
necessities. . . . We must accommodate our idiosyncracies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life.
Cummins, 516 F.2d at 550 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.
1953)).
To the extent that religious accommodation statutes do not require any government action which inhibits the free exercise of religion, they cannot be justified on the basis of the free
exercise clause. Unlike the draft exemption cases, see infra note 166, there is no law which
compels any person to work for any particular employer. Conversely, there is no constitutional requirement that an employer must make jobs available to Sabbath observers on their
terms. By enforcing such provisions, government abandons the benevolent neutrality permitted by the establishment clause.
See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 668-69 ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral
course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms. . . . Short
of [establishment of or governmental interference with religion] there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality. . . ."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 314.
166. Furthermore, when government participates in this effort by enforcing any such "accommodation" it not only violates its obligation of neutrality, it directly contravenes the establishment clause. This is true whether it does so in absolute terms, as Connecticut has done, or
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ute, fails the first prong of the Nyquist test; both statutes, because of their
sectarian purposes, are unconstitutional.
Primary Effect
The second element of the Nyquist test requires that a statute have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. The primary
effect of enforcing either the state or federal religious accommodation
provisions is the same because both statutes require employers to grant
preferences on the basis of religion. Thus, the primary effect of both the
Connecticut statute and title VII section 701(j) may be determined by
using the same analysis.
Determining the primary effect of a statute is often difficult. Nevertheless, several factors pertinent to the evaluation of primary effect
emerge from Supreme Court opinions. First, the state may not directly or
whether it makes judgments about "reasonableness" and "undue hardship," as title VII purports to do.
Proponents of religious accommodation statutes rely heavily on the draft exemption cases
to support the argument that granting certain exemptions to religious observers is constitutional under a free exercise rationale. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
The draft exemption cases, however, simply do not address the question of whether government has the constitutional authority to impose upon private employers a duty to give
preferences to certain religious beliefs. Instead, the courts in these cases approve the authority
of Congress to exempt conscientious objectors from military service obligations imposed by the
government. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445 ("fundamental principles of conscience and religious
duty may sometimes override the demands of a secular state"). Religious accommodation
cases usually do not present tensions between government requirements and religious beliefs,
but instead involve the authority of the government to legislate affirmatively to advance religious beliefs in a manner which requires employers to treat religious employees differently
from others.
Significantly, the only religious accommodation cases which arguably involve "government action" similar to that in such cases as Sherbert and Yoder are those in which a union
sought to enforce statutorily authorized union security provisions under section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), against individuals who demanded exemption from dues payment obligations for religious reasons. See, e.g., McDaniel v.
Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1982); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d
445, 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648
F.2d 1245, 1245 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Burns v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). However, it is well established that the enforcement of union security provisions in such circumstances does not violate the free exercise clause. Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television and
Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Hammond v. United
Papermakers and Paperworkers Union, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028
(1972); Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1001 (1972); Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 306 F.Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
Neither the draft exemption cases nor the union dues cases, therefore, provide authority
for the view that a Sabbath observer has an enforceable constitutional right to interfere with
his employer's business operations by demanding religious accommodation.
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indirectly promote religion through the use of its coercive power. For
example, such activities as Bible-reading 167 and officially sponsored
prayers 16 8 may be impermissible because their possible secular benefits
are inseparable from the sponsorship of religion. Statutes that prescribe
a particular form of religious worship, such as prayer, 169 or that allow
public schoolrooms to be used for religious instruction 170 may be impermissible because of their indirect coercive effect. Second, the state may
not delegate any of its regulatory authority to religious bodies, because
such actions link religious observance to the power and prestige of the
state and provide a symbolic or actual benefit to religion.171 Third, the
state may not provide financial support to religion, either directly or indirectly. For example, the Court has struck down teacher salary supplements 172 and tuition reimbursements 173 because their effect was to
subsidize parochial education. 174 In this context, the Court appears particularly sensitive to whether the state funds are disbursed to individuals
or to religious institutions. 175 Finally, the Court considers the breadth of
the class which receives a benefit. For example, tax deductions 176 and
other forms of tax relief' 77 have been held invalid if such public assistance was available only to parents with children in nonpublic schools.
Conversely, the Court has upheld tax deductions for educational expenses when the deductions were available to all parents with children in
school, including those whose children attended public schools. 178
These principles may be distilled to three essential factors that the
courts use to determine whether the primary effect of a religious accommodation statute is consistent with the establishment clause. First, the
Court must consider whether the statute advances the interests of religious persons and, in so doing, favors them over the interests of nonreligious persons. Second, the Court must assess whether the law favors the
interests of certain sects over other sects. Third, the Court must ascer167. See, eg., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
168. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
169. Id. at 431.
170. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
171. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 121 (1982).
172. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
173. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
174. The Court has also invalidated construction grants to sectarian colleges even though
the grants only had the partial effect of financing religious instruction. Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971).
175. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781. The textbook cases are instructive because textbooks have
no inherent religious significance. For example, the Court has upheld state loans of textbooks
to schoolchildren who attend private and parochial schools. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968). On the other hand, it has refused to permit state textbook loans directly to sectarian schools. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), reh'g denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975).
176. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
177. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
178. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
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tain whether government has singled out, on the basis of religion, a narrow class of citizens as beneficiaries of compulsory special treatment.
Proponents of the Connecticut Sabbath statute argue that the primary effect of both section 53-303e(b) and section 7010) is the inhibition
of discrimination rather than the advancement of religion. 179 According
to this view, neither statute encourages religious activities or compels
Sabbath observers to refrain from work on their Sabbaths.' 80 Thus, any
benefit that Sabbath accommodation brings to religion is the indirect result of private decisions by employees. 181
These advocates further assert that laws which authorize Sabbath
observers, but not employees who do not observe a Sabbath, to select a
day off do not advance religion because such laws simply provide an opportunity for religious observance. They conclude that this is a permissible burden on nonobserver employees who must work in order to
accommodate a fellow employee's statutory rights to Sabbath
observance. 182
These arguments are not compelling. First, the proponents' reasoning ignores the fact that religious accommodation statutes favor religious
persons over nonreligious persons. The statutes require employers to
grant a desirable employment benefit-weekend time off-to those who
seek it for religious reasons, to the detriment of those who seek it for
secular reasons. Employers are not required to grant requests for accommodation by nonreligious employees, or by religious employees whose
faith is not the basis of their requests, no matter how important the accommodation may be to such persons.18 3 Because an employer can grant
179.

Brief for Petitioner at 31.

180. Id.
181. Id. at 32.
182. These arguments rely on analogies to cases involving exemptions of religious individuals from compulsory school attendance, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
and military service obligations, see, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
183. For example, in Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979), the
court implicitly recognized the preferential treatment accorded by § 7010) when it observed
that § 7010) "does not require an employer to reasonably accommodate the purely personal
preferences of its employees. Accordingly, the costs [of accommodating a religious observer]
do not include excusing vast numbers of employees who wish to have Friday night off for
secular reasons." Id. at 960.
The inherently preferential nature of the accommodation requirement becomes clear if we
consider the case of an employer who accommodated employees on the basis of union membership or nonmembership with regard to their objections to various job or dues requirements. If
an employer accommodated the shift preferences of nonunion members but not those of union
members, such action would be unlawful discrimination with regard to terms of employment,
which is prohibited by section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982). The preferential nature of such accommodation is not altered when the
basis upon which such accommodation is granted happens to be religious practices or beliefs
rather than union affiliation.
Significantly, nonreligious employees may have equally strong reasons for preferring not
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weekend time off to only a limited number of employees, workers who
observe a Sabbath receive greater access to this important aspect of employment. Thus, both section 53-303e(b) and section 7010) primarily
benefit Sabbath observers over those who do not observe a Sabbath.
Second, government's protection of a particular religious practiceSabbath observance-violates its duty to act neutrally towards various
religious sects.1 84 For example, some religious denominations specifically require observance of a Sunday Sabbath;1 85 other denominations
do not. 186 While members of these latter sects could find scriptural or
other religious authority to support an assertion that it is a religious duty
to refrain from Sabbath work, their claims are less likely to be protected
than those supported by official denominational doctrine. Both section
53-303e(b) and section 7010) require a claimant to show a "bona fide and
sincere religious belief;"' 87 meeting this burden is easier for a member of
a sect having a strong official position regarding Sabbath observance. As
a result, these statutes favor members of sects which take this position. 188
Moreover, some sects do not have a "Sabbath" at all. 189 Adherents
of these religious faiths receive no benefit from statutes which accommodate Sabbath observance. They also bear a heavier burden of showing
the bona fides of other, nontraditional holy days. The establishment
clause, however, not only proscribes aid to traditional religions as against
nonbelievers, but also precludes aid favoring "those religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." 1 90 Thus, these laws violate the establishment clause not only
because they aid religion, but also because they aid religion
inequitably. 19 1
to work on weekends, but cannot invoke the benefits which these statutes afford co-workers
who use their religious beliefs to claim time off.
184. See, eg., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
185. E.g., Catholic and most Protestant denominations.
186. E.g., Orthodox Jews, Seventh Day Adventists, Seventh Day Baptists, and World
Wide Church of God. The lower court's careful analysis of the term "Sabbath" illustrates the
term's essential identification with the Judeo-Christian sects alone. Thornton, 191 Conn. at

347 n.8, 464 A.2d at 793 n.8. This provision thus favors those sects which observe a 'Sabbath'
over other sects which do not.
187. See infra notes 223-27 & accompanying text.
188. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). By requiring an accommodation
to Sabbath observers which others may not enjoy, religious accommodation laws set out a
special class based on religion. Accepting the fact that religious discrimination is impermissible, the question still remains whether the preferences required by these statutes are
constitutional.
189. E.g., most Eastern religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, and
Confucianism.
190. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495.
191. An employer faced with conflicting demands of several religious employees may be
forced by business needs to choose which one receives time off, thus expressing an impermissible preference between religions.
This unequal treatment among religious sects provides some argument for "strict scru-
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Third, the extension of a state-granted benefit to a wide class of both
religious and nonreligious beneficiaries is an important index of secular
effect. 192 The Supreme Court has often recognized the narrowness of the
benefited class as a key factor in primary effect analysis. 193 In Gillette v.
United States,194 the Court approved Justice Harlan's earlier analysis of
statutory "underinclusion":
Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of gov-

ernmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.
In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that [all groups that]
could be thought to fall within the natural
95
perimeter [are included]. 1
The application of this standard to both section 53-303e(b) and section
7010) reveals that both statutes are underinclusive because they exclude
from their protection a number of groups which "could be thought to fall
within its natural perimeter." 196 The class of persons who are affected by
an employment practice 197 includes all employees with bona fide reasons
for wishing to be excused from compliance with that practice. The pretiny" analysis rather than the traditional Nyquist analysis. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982); see also supra notes 92-95 & accompanying text. This conclusion, however, is unwarranted. The statute in Larson dealt only with religious denominations; there was no issue of
favoring religion over nonreligion. The statute in Thornton favors Sabbath observers over
those who observe no Sabbath. Thus, the effect of § 53-303e(b) is different from the effect of
the statute in Larson; it gives rise to unequal treatment rather than facial discrimination among
religions, as was the case in Larson.
192. The petitioner has argued that it is permissible for government to accommodate certain individual religious claims while declining to make adjustments for analogous secular beliefs. See Brief for Petitioner at 33.
193. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068 (1983); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825, 831 (1973).
Petitioner's argument that § 53-303e(b) does not provide an economic benefit to organized
religion, see Brief for Petitioner at 23, is contradicted by analysis of primary effect, which is not
limited to financial aid alone. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). It is clearly an economic benefit to remain employed while receiving time off not enjoyed by other employees and,
at the same time, to be immune from discharge, because of religious practice.
194. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
195. Walz, 397 U.S. at 696.
196. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452. Equal treatment of all persons regardless of religious belief
or lack thereof is a primary establishment clause concern. In his dissent in Gillette, 401 U.S. at
468-69, Justice Douglas quoted with approval Justice Black's dissent in Zorach, 343 U.S. at
320: "The First Amendment has lost much if the religious follower and the atheist are no
longer to be judicially regarded as entitled to equal justice under law."
In this regard, the Solicitor General of the United States admitted the fundamental problem of unequal treatment under these statutes when he said "a governmental accommodation
to religion might well be invalid if it discriminated among religions or if it amounted to an
endorsement of a particular religion," while conceding that these statutes "[do] not, of course,
benefit all persons equally." Brief for United States at 19.
197. Weekend shifts and dues obligations under union security provisions are examples of
such practices.
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cise nature of the reason asserted should be immaterial-if the individual
is not accommodated, he falls within the class of those adversely treated.
Yet, under section 53-303e(b) and section 701(j), only those with religious reasons are benefited.
Nondiscrimination statutes generally require employers to refrain
from using religion to treat employees differentially. The proponents of
religious accommodation overlook that these statutes impose a duty on
employers to accommodate, although no discrimination on the basis of
religion has occurred. Employees are treated equally until accommodation is required. 198 Religious accommodation statutes, however, require
employers to change otherwise legitimate employment practices, such as
a workweek schedule that affects all relevant employees, in response to
religious beliefs which not all employees hold. On the other hand, if an
employer refuses to grant any requests for religious accommodation in
scheduling work, the Sabbath observer is treated equally with all others
in the workplace, and no discrimination occurs. Therefore, in this situation, such refusals to accommodate are not discriminatory.
The Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison' 99 supports this notion of the effect of religious accommodation
statutes. In Hardison, an airline maintenance employee had joined a
church that observed a Saturday Sabbath. He transferred to a work site
where, because of his low seniority, he was assigned to Saturday workshifts. After he was discharged for refusing to work on Saturdays, he
brought suit under title VII. The Court held that section 7010) did not
require the employer to override the seniority provisions in its union contract or to bear more than de minimis costs in order to help the employee
meet his religious obligations. 2 °° Although the Court did not reach the
establishment clause issue, its decision reflected the equal protection
analysis implicit in establishment clause challenges. The Court ruled that
requiring TWA to incur additional costs for Hardison and not for other
employees would constitute unequal treatment of employees on the basis
of their religion. To require TWA to incur certain costs to give Hardison
Saturdays off would in effect "require TWA to finance an additional Saturday off and then to choose the employee who will enjoy it on the basis
of his religious beliefs." '20 1 While such increased staffing might eliminate
the need to assign another employee to work in Hardison's place, the
198. See Brief for Petitioner at 24 ("[W]hen Sabbath work is demanded by facially neutral
employment requirements, [the employee] suffers discrimination on religious grounds."); Brief
for Intervenor at 24 (The purpose of § 53-303e(b) is "to 'achieve equality of employment opportunities by eliminating discriminatory employment practices."); Brief for United States at
19 ("[I]ndividuals should be able to practice their religion in accordance with their own convictions, without undue economic pressure or penalty.")
199. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
200. Id. at 83-84.
201. Id. at 84.
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privilege of having Saturdays off would still be allocated according to
religious beliefs and thus would work to the detriment of the employee
20 2
who is required to replace the religiously observant employee.
Although Hardison involved a controversy under title VII, the
Court's analysis applies with equal force to the scrutiny of Connecticut's

section 53-303e(b) at issue in Thornton.20 3 If the government requires
that employers administer fundamental employment practices solely on

the basis of employees' religious beliefs, 2° 4 the government is not acting
neutrally with respect to religion. Nonreligious employees, or religious
employees whose sects do not observe a Sabbath, are treated unequally
with regard to the same employment practices.
In sum, instead of prohibiting religious discrimination, section 53303e(b) and section 7010) advance religious interests and exhibit none of
the features that might justify their primary effect under the establishment clause. First, the statutes neither purport to be neutral nor confer a
benefit that is simply incidental or indirect. Second, they are generally
applicable not to a broad class of persons, but only to Sabbath observers.
For these reasons, both statutes have the primary effect of advancing religion, and both statutes are thereby invalid under the second prong of the
Nyquist test.
Entanglement
The final element of the Nyquist test prohibits excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Entanglement occurs when administration of a government program involves surveillance and evaluation of
religious institutions. For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission,20 5 the
Court discerned that the official and continuing state surveillance inherent in programs of state-granted benefits and privileges based on religion
constituted excessive entanglement. 20 6 Following this reasoning, the
202. Id. at 85; see also id. at 81 ("Title VII does not require an employer to deny the shift
and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in
order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others."); id. at 83 ("TWA was not
required by Title VII to carve out a special exception to its seniority system in order to help
Hardison meet his religious obligations.").
203. 191 Conn. at 348, 464 A.2d at 794.
204. The issue of preferential treatment is raised when demands by religious observers for
accommodation include requests to be excused from work early, to be relieved of the obligation to pay union dues, to be excused from grooming or dress code requirements, and to have
certain dietary preferences recognized in the company cafeteria. See EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (1980).
205. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
206. Justice Harlan was persuaded that the statute in question was valid only because its
scope was so broad as to include nonreligious organizations as well and thus "need not entangle government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious." Id. at 698 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan went on to warn, however, that a statute which was framed more
narrowly might inescapably lead to judicial inquiry into dogma or belief: "Obviously the more
discriminating and complicated the basis of classification for an exemption-even a neutral
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Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman20 7 struck down a scheme of teacher salary
supplements in sectarian schools because the program would have necessitated "comprehensive, discriminatory, and continuing state surveillance" 20 s that would bring about excessive entanglement with religion.
Entanglement problems also arise when the government or courts
must evaluate religious facets of school programs. For example, in New
York v. CathedralAcademy, 20 9 the Court struck down a reimbursement
scheme because the determination of the program's religious aspects
could involve judicial action. 2 10 Similarly, in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop,2 11 the Court affirmed the restraint on the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction over lay teachers employed by a parochial
school because inquiry into the religious nature of challenged practices
might arise. 2 12 The Court concluded that such entanglement would create at least
a significant risk that the first amendment would be
2 13
infringed.
The entanglement principle, however, is not confined to government
interference with religious institutions; it also limits the scope of judicial
inquiry into a claimed religious belief.2 14 Because the establishment
clause prevents law from entering the purely private domain of religion,
it necessarily follows that government cannot examine religious affirmations. If the Constitution prohibits government inquiry into questions of
religious dogma and belief, the "clearest and surest way to this end is for
government not to inquire into the truth of religious claims or the degree
of sincerity with which they are maintained. ' 215 Thus, the entanglement
problem arises whenever an individual claims that his conduct or belief is
"religious" under a statute that grants a privilege based on religious
one-the greater the potential for state involvement in evaluating the character of the organization." Id. at 698-99. This warning is even more potent with respect to an individual's religious beliefs.
207. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
208. Id. at 619.
209. 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
210. The Court declared: "The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what
does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee
against religious establishment, and it cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only once."
Id. at 133.
211. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
212. The Court observed that:
[R]esolution of charges [thatchallenged practices are mandated by religious creeds]
. ..will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted. ...
[It is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge
on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry
leading to findings and conclusions.
Id. at 502.
213. Id.
214. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
215. M. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 68 (1968).
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2 16

belief.
Those who favor religious accommodation statutes argue that the
government entanglement generated by these statutes is not excessive because government is involved in religion only for the purpose of outlawing religious discrimination in employment. 2 17 They assert that whether
a particular day is observed as the Sabbath by a given religion is unlikely
to be open to serious dispute2 18 and, while religious accommodation laws
may require government to determine the sincerity of an individual's
claimed Sabbath observance, this involves no more entanglement than
similar inquiries necessary for implementing other constitutional reli21 9
gious accommodations.
This somewhat circular reasoning is unpersuasive. As the Connecticut Supreme Court perceived, it is the potential for government entanglement with religion "which is most troublesome when considering § 53303e(b)." 2 20 Section 7010) is similarly flawed. Under both statutes, it is
the religious nature of the conduct or belief that triggers the statutory
benefit. By mandating such a privilege, the government necessarily assumes the power to determine what constitutes a religion. 22 1 It makes no
difference whether this is done overtly by definition, as in section 701(j),
or implicitly through enforcement, as in section 53-303e(b). In either
case, the government expresses its official approval or disapproval of certain religious practices through its power to grant or withhold the privileged status. When government assumes this power, it engages in a
222
fundamental form of entanglement.
Moreover, if the availability of a benefit hinges on the existence of a
religious ground, then inquiry into the bona fides of such a claim cannot
be avoided. 22 3 Instead, it must first be determined whether the asserted
belief is "religious" within the meaning of the relevant statutes and, second, whether it is sincerely held. 224 To avoid the obvious constitutional
problems raised by inquiry into the validity of an asserted belief, those
216. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
217. See Brief for Petitioner at 36.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 191 Conn. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794.
221. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).
222. See, e.g., Anderson v. General Dynamics, 489 F. Supp. 782, 791 (S.D. Cal. 1980),
rev'd., 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Gavin v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622, 632 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 613 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980).
223. See, e.g., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 559 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 429
U.S. 65 (1975), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Gavin, 464 F. Supp. at 631. See generally Edwards and Kaplan, Religious Discriminationand the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69
MICH. L. REV. 599, 614-19 (1971).
224. For example, Judge Celebrezze recognized this distinction in his dissent in Cummins,
516 F.2d at 559 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
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who support religious accommodation statutes urge that the only issue
that needs to be considered is "sincerity. '225 This analysis, however,
would eliminate the threshold issue of whether an asserted belief is entitled to statutory protection; this leads in turn to the untenable position
that an individual who sincerely advances any allegedly religious claim,
no matter how obscure or absurd, would be protected. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has noted, " 'sincerity' is a concept that can bear only so

much adjudicative weight.

'226

Thus, the plaintiff's §incerity is not dis-

positive of his or her claim.

Both section 53-303e(b) and section 7016) thrust the entanglement
issue into the foreground. To establish a prima facie case of religious
discrimination under title VII, a plaintiff, as a threshold matter, must
plead and prove that he had a sincere bona fide religious belief which
conflicted with a particular employment practice, such as work schedules.227 If the plaintiff lacks a bona fide religious belief, the duty to accommodate never arises because employers need not oblige purely

personal preferences. Similarly, under section 53-303e(b), if there is no
bona fide claim of observing a Sabbath, the employer is not required to
excuse the employee from work.
Accordingly, employers may have to require some proof, beyond a

mere declaration of sincerity, that a particular day is an employee's Sab-

bath. 228 The government requires the employer, therefore, to decide

whether an asserted belief is religious. As the intensity of litigation in
225. See Brief for Petitioner at 36.
226. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 457. The analogy to the draft exemption cases, see supra note
166, does not minimize the fact that courts must determine what constitutes Sabbath observance under either § 53-303e(b) or § 7010) of title VII. In those cases, the Supreme Court did
not provide a constitutional definition of "religious belief" which would control in the construction of other statutes. As the Court stated in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174
(1965), the Court construed the meaning of "religious" "solely in relation to the language of
[the Selective Service Act] and not otherwise." Further, the Court construed the statute at
issue in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), so as to eliminate the religious content
necessary for conscientious objector status. In those cases, the sincerity inquiry was necessary
only because a government-imposed need for military manpower potentially infringed on free
exercise rights. Therefore, the argument that the governmental entanglement required to enforce religious accommodation statutes is not more than that required under the draft exemption cases is based on a questionable analogy.
227. See Anderson v. General Dynamics, 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 921 (1979); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1978). In this
regard, the court of appeals in Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980),
was clearly in error when it held that "the constitutional issue presupposes lack of accommodation." Id. at 484-85. Contrary to the court's reasoning, however, until there is a determination of the validity and sincerity of the belief in question, no duty to accommodate can be said
to exist.
228. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 149, at 187. There is no necessary connection
between membership in a sect and sincere belief in and adherence to that sect's tenets. Furthermore, some people join religious groups for reasons other than religious beliefs. This is not
to disparage such reasons but merely to indicate that individuals with no particular religious
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this area indicates, the employer's decision will be subject to judicial
scrutiny. 229 Significantly, neither the EEOC nor the courts have to date
provided employers with guidance on these difficult questions. 230 Furthermore, the court must assess the reasonableness of the asserted belief
which is then balanced against the employer's interest. 23' This balancing, however, leads to a constitutionally forbidden inquiry into the valid232
ity of a religious belief.
Entanglement also occurs if the statutory scheme requires religious
interests to be balanced against other employment interests. Under section 701(j) of title VII, the employer's affirmative duty to accommodate
an employee's religious beliefs is not absolute, but is limited to reasonable
accommodation. 233 Thus, courts are necessarily required to weigh the
religious interest against the employment interest. This fact is most apparent in cases involving religious accommodation demands which
would contravene seniority provisions in union contracts. 234 For example, in Hardison235 the Court interpreted the reasonable accommodation
requirement of section 701(j) as subordinate to the provisions of the
236
union contract and the seniority rights of other employees.
motivation could find it convenient to request accommodation to their sect's generally accepted practices.
229. The courts are thus forced into the business of determining whether a belief is religious and sincere. In this regard, the confusion of the courts on their proper role is apparent.
For example, the courts in Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d at 900, and Cooper v. General
Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977), found that "all
forms and aspects of religion, however eccentric," are protected. Other courts have rejected
eccentric religious beliefs simply because they are not "generally accepted." See, e.g., Brown v.
Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979). The first
amendment implications of such approaches are manifest, for they portend the clear possibility
of the courts denying statutory protection to beliefs that are genuinely but not widely held.
230. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
231. The determination under § 701(j) of what is reasonable accommodation without undue hardship does not eliminate these difficulties but rather demonstrates the entanglement
that the establishment clause seeks to avoid. See, e.g., Mann v. Milgram Food Stores, 34 Fair
Emp. Prac. Cas. 735 (8th Cir. 1984); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108
(N.D. Ga. 1980); King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1983). Cf. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561
F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
232. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); see also Cooper v. General
Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
233. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Joint District No. 28J, 34 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1570 (10th Cir.
1984); Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979); Jordan v. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
234. See infra notes 235-36 & accompanying text.
235. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
236. Id. at 79-81; accord Huston v. Local No. 93, UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977).
Indeed, the principle that, absent intentional discrimination in their application, seniority systems under § 703(h) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), take precedence over other
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Hardison stands at least for the proposition that regulating private
conduct by mandating preferential treatment on the basis of religion
could raise serious constitutional questions. 237 Because Connecticut's
Sabbath statute is broader than section 7010) in that it permits no exceptions to the duty to accommodate, the state statute cannot avoid raising
the constitutional questions obviated for the federal statute by the statutory interpretation in Hardison.238
In sum, implementation of either Connecticut's section 53-303e(b)
or title VII section 7010) will excessively entangle government and religion. In view of the practical problems of defining religious belief and
the constitutional problems in inquiring into sincerity, the Supreme
Court in Thornton should rule that section 53-303e(b) fosters impermissible government entanglement with religion. The invalidation of the religious accommodation rules in this case would not represent hostility or
callous indifference toward religion, but simply a neutral attitude on government's part. 239 The implication that opposition to a statutorily man-

dated duty to accommodate Sabbath observers equals hostility to religion
24°
confuses an objection to compulsion with an objection to religion.
Conclusion
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor presents the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to resolve the constitutionality of statutes requiring religious
accommodation in the workplace. The decision in Thornton could affect
aspects of antidiscrimination statutes has been repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court. See,
eg., Memphis Fire Dept. v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177
(1983).
237. Cf Hardison, 432 U.S. at 90 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970), aftid per curiam by evenly divided court,
402 U.S. 689 (1971).
238. Those who support religious accommodation statutes point out that many states have
enacted statutes that require employers to make accommodation to their employees' religious
observances. Of the state provisions which relate to private employment, see supra note 25,
however, 31 provide simply for nondiscrimination because of religion, while only 19 have some
sort of reasonable accommodation requirement. None have the absolute mandate contained in
Connecticut's penal statute. Thus, the argument that § 53-303e(b) is similar to other laws
protecting religious observers is unsupported. There is a clear difference between an absolute
mandate and one which provides for exceptions. Nevertheless, any government involvement
favoring religion violates the establishment clause. Whether it does so in all cases or just in
those where no "hardship" is demonstrated is constitutionally irrelevant.
239. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 556 (6th Cir. 1975) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting), affid, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977). As Justice Brennan stated in
his concurring 6pinion in Schempp, "inevitably, insistence upon neutrality. . . may appear to
border upon religious hostility. But in the long view the independence of both church and
state . . . will be better served by close adherence to the neutrality principle." Abington
School Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 246 (1963); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
240. See., eg., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 324 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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the validity of the religious accommodation provisions of title VII as well
as the states' power to mandate religious accommodation by private
employers.
The applicable standard of review under the establishment clause is
the three-part test of secular purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement, as articulated in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.
Neither the Connecticut Sabbath statute nor section 7010) of title VII
withstands scrutiny under any of the three prongs of the test.
The language and the legislative history of both statutes indicate
that they were enacted for impermissible sectarian purposes. The primary effect of both section 53-303e(b) and section 701(j) is the advancement of religion, because they confer an employment benefit on an
explicitly religious basis. Finally, the enforcement of both rules results in
impermissible government entanglement with religion through inquiry
into the validity and sincerity of individual religious beliefs.
Current nondiscrimination statutes mandate that religion should
never be a factor in the employment arena. Neither discrimination nor
accommodation because of religion should be countenanced. The
Supreme Court, in striking down religious accommodation rules, would
merely ensure that no employees are favored or disadvantaged due to
their religious beliefs, or lack thereof. This is not to say that an employer
could not, as a matter of sound business practice and enlightened employee relations, accommodate employee religious practices. Forbidding
the government from requiring accommodation would not preclude accommodation in the workplace by private employers. The room for play
in the joints between the free exercise and establishment clauses is properly left for the employer and the employee to work out for themselves,
free from government interference. The Supreme Court should acknowledge in Thornton that these practical difficulties and constitutional
problems make accommodation of religion in the workplace a matter of
individual discretion, not governmental policy.
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